介紹中國穆斯林受沙烏地教育影響的文章
Salafism, or Salafiyya, is a
doctrinal-intellectual current within Islam that espouses a return to the ways
of the Salaf As-Salih (the Pious Ancestors), the first three generations of
Muslims who lived during and after the death of the Prophet Mohammed. Often
described as being rooted in the works of the medieval scholars Ibn Hanbal and
Ibn Taymiyyah, Salafism seeks to establish a more “authentic” religious
experience predicated on a presumably correct reading of the Quran and the sunnah
(the sayings and practices of the Prophet) and away from the supposed bid’ah
(innovations) and heretical practices that have “polluted” it.
This current moreover embraces to a
certain extent a rejection of the madhhab
(legal school) Sunni traditions that had
emerged in Islam’s early centuries. As a relatively modern phenomenon building
on the Sunni orthodox revivals of the 18th century, the failures of traditional
Muslim authorities to contend with mounting internal and external challenges,
as well as the spread of new modernistic discourses, Salafism found a popular
following across many Muslim societies in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. Its growth was facilitated by Saudi
Arabia – which embraced its own idiosyncratic brand of Salafism rooted in the
mid-18th century religious revivalism that swept central Arabia (usually denoted by its detractors as Wahhabism after
its “founder” Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab) – especially after its annexation of Mecca and Medina in 1924-25, and
the subsequent influx of oil wealth, which
endowed the country with the religious authority and means (universities,
charities, organizations, preachers, and communicative mediums) to promote this current globally.
Among China’s Hui ethnic group,
Saudi-influenced Salafism has been present for nearly a century. Aside from the intellectual residue influencing other
sects and currents, its most obvious manifestation
is to be found in the Salafi sect, which constitutes a small minority within
the community of the faithful in China. Concentrated in small clusters across the Northwest and
Yunnan, and identified by their “Saudi”
clothes, Salafis have elicited fear and
opposition from their ideological opponents within the wider Chinese Muslim
community, leading at times to outright sectarian conflict.
Since the 1990s, and particularly following 9/11, the Chinese state has placed the Salafi
community under close surveillance, fearing
that its close connections with Saudi Arabia as well as presumed Uighur Salafi
networks, not to mention the sect’s considerable growth over the past few years
(attracting not only other Hui, but increasingly Han as well), might herald
political and religious violence in the future. These security concerns have only abounded with the rising specter
of the Islamic State and the appearance of a few Chinese fighters in the ranks
of the contending Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq.
Historical Roots of Chinese
Salafism
Although relatively isolated since
the 14th century with the disintegration of the Yuan dynasty, the Hui Muslim communities, and especially those in the
Northwest of China, remained open to the religious and intellectual influences
emanating from other parts of the Muslim world. The spread of the various Sufi tariqas (orders), such as the Naqshibandis,
Kubrawis, and Qadiris, during the late Ming and early Qing in China in the 17th
century, as well as the consolidation of Sufi tariqas with their own
distinct lineages, tombs and practices (such as the Khuffiyya and Jahriyya), is
indicative of this permeability, which endured primarily through the Hajj and
overland trade networks via Central Asia and Yunnan.
Unsurprisingly, the transmission of Salafism – or initially Wahhabi ideas –
amongst the Hui follows this template in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries.
Wahhabism gained converts in China
throughout the Republican era, primarily as
a byproduct of the growing traffic of Muslim pilgrims going to the Hejaz,
facilitated by the proliferation of new means of transportation such as the
steamship. Between 1923 and 1934, hundreds of Hui
Muslims made the Hajj. In 1937 –
prior to the full-fledged Japanese invasion of the country – well over 170 Hui reportedly boarded a steamer in Shanghai
bound for Mecca. The effects of this were
palpable, ranging from a noticeable
increase in the availability of Wahhabi literature across China in the 1930s, as observed by the scholar Ma Tong, to high-profile
conversions of detractors of the movement, including Sufi Sheiks.
It is from within this context that
the first pronounced Salafiyya sect emerged within China and mostly, interestingly enough, in reaction to the perceived
“departure” of the Yihewani movement from its puritan and proto-Wahhabi ethos.
The founding propagator of an explicit Salafism is usually identified as Ma Debao (1867-1977),
originally a Yihewani adherent who officiated in various mosques across the
Northwest. His earliest encounters with Salafism
came through a visiting – presumably Arab – scholar who settled in Xining,
Qinghai in 1934 to teach the Wahhabi doctrine. This exposure led him to reassess some of his views, although
his major intellectual transformation would only come when he departed for the
Hajj in 1936, a period during which he spent considerable time at the Salafi
Dar Al-Hadith school.
On returning to China in 1937, Ma
Debao became an enthusiastic promoter of the teachings, quickly gathering a
following of his own centered in the Xinwang mosque in Linxia, Gansu and
breaking away in turn from the Yihewani movement, whom he perceived to have compromised their beliefs. His Salafi group encountered strong opposition from the
established Yihewani clergy and their
warlord backers, forcing the movement to assume a more cautious and quietest
attitude towards politics for the sake of its survival.
After the founding of the People’s
Republic in 1949, the Salafis – now
unfettered by the Muslim warlords – experienced
a brief period of religious growth, with its leadership actively participating
in a number of state organs as well as the newly created Islamic Association of
China (IAC). This soon came to an end as the
1958 “Religious Reform Campaign,” followed by the Great Leap Forward
(1958-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), forced the movement underground as many of its leaders and
adherents were killed off or sent to concentration camps. It survived as remnants from the leadership settled in
Xinjiang and Tibet during these difficult years.
Channels of Saudi Influence
The start of the “Reform and Opening Up” in 1978 signaled the end of a dark
period of sustained persecution against China’s Muslim communities, including
the Salafis. The dismantlement of restrictions
on religious worship, the restoration of mosques, and the reformation of the
IAC served to reconsolidate state control over these
communities but more significantly, served to showcase (in a resurrection of Chinese foreign policy patterns in the
1950s) Beijing’s tolerance of Islam, a policy principally aimed at courting the
support of various Muslim states. The direct
outcome of this new “opening” allowed the re-introduction, and even
amplification of, Saudi Salafi influences across the country, with implications
for both the Salafi and wider Muslim community as a whole. This occurred through various channels, the most important of which was the restoration of the Hajj
missions in 1979 (after nearly a
decade-long suspension dating from 1964) followed by new regulations allowing
private individuals to make the pilgrimage in 1984, that allowed considerable numbers of Hui Muslims – jumping from
nearly 2000 in 1985 to nearly 10,000 annually in 1990 – to travel to the
Kingdom. There, some of these pilgrims opted
to stay for further study or came in touch with relatives from the
well-established Chinese Saudi diaspora (which had settled in the Hedjaz
following the end of the Chinese civil war and received citizenship there). These interactions exposed Chinese Muslims to new
discourses and religious experiences that challenged their own traditional
understandings of Islam. They returned to China carrying Wahhabi books, leaflets,
fatwas (religious rulings), and sermon tapes that broadly disseminated Salafi
ideas.
Other significant channels included
the arrival of Saudi organizations and preachers in China during the 1980s. Initially, religious activities were limited to
influential groups like the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, the Muslim
World League, and the Islamic Development Bank, which operated under the
auspices of the IAC and in turn re-directed their efforts in a non-sectarian
fashion. Their activities, beyond providing alternative channels of
communication between Saudi and Chinese officials, encompassed the construction
of various Islamic Institutes, the renovation of major mosques, the initiation
of a Quranic printing and distribution project (in 1987, more than a million copies were disbursed across China as
a “royal gift” from the Saudi King), and the provision of training workshops
for clerics and scholarships for students (initially in China and Pakistan,) amongst others.
By the mid-1980s, religious policies
were relaxed considerably, allowing for a growing number of Saudi private
organizations and individuals (mainly preachers and missionaries bringing in
religious literature) to increasingly work outside established IAC channels. In this new environment, these entities began to
selectively target their funding towards specific groups – particularly those
visibly identified as Salafi in places like Gansu, Qinhai, Ningxia, Shanxi, and
Yunnan – and popularize certain discourses that might have been rejected by the
IAC for fear of inviting state reprimand.
The activities of these groups were
greatly facilitated by a network of Chinese Salafi activists who had graduated
from Saudi or Saudi-affiliated institutions like Imam Saudi University, Umm
Al-Qura, and Medina University. While numbers
are hard to come by, one study from
Medina University shows that between 1961 and 2000/2001, over 652 scholarships
were granted to mainland Chinese. Nearly 76
percent of these were offered in the 1980s and 90s alone. While significant
numbers of the graduates (who ofter never actually completed their studies)
gravitated towards middlemen jobs in Guangzhou or Yiwu where they could utilize
their Arabic proficiency, a few joined privately run religious academies in
Yunnan or Gansu, and some began officiating in mosques after the longstanding
official barriers on the hiring of foreign-trained Imams eased in the 2000s. A
smaller but far more influential group fostered close ties with Saudi
organizations and preachers – a relationship that was beneficial to both sides.
The Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, which came under a U.S.-backed UN ban in 2004 due to its
presumed affiliations with Al-Qaeda, is illustrative. Throughout the 1990s, the organization expended considerable funds
on the construction of Salafi mosques across China, the maintenance of Salafi-aligned schools (typically “Arabic
language” schools that double as Islamic institutions), and the provision of
scholarships for interested students – an array of activities that were largely
overseen by various (at times competing) circles of Medina University graduates
who leveraged their influence within the wider community.
In conjunction with these
developments, Beijing had assumed a more cautious
attitude by the 1990s, typified by the barring
of entry of suspected preachers, continued refusal
to offer scholarships for students heading to Saudi Arabia, and the introduction of new laws that restricted foreign
religious activities, including one in 1994 that banned donations made outside
the auspices of the IAC. Unsurprisingly, these restrictions have grown more
stringent over the last decade, but they have not severed the Saudi ties
altogether.
The Saudi Impact
Saudi influences have had a somewhat
contradictory impact on Hui Salafis and the wider Muslim community in China. On one level,
these influences have contributed – to a degree – to the salafisation (namely, a cultural and religious approximation of an
“idealized” Saudi orthodoxy) of Hui Muslim society. This salafisation subsumes
the adoption of presumably Salafi doctrines, prayers rituals, attitudes, and
even culturally authentic attire (the Saudi headgear worn in a manner usually
associated with the religiously conservative in the Kingdom) and mosque architecture
under what can be described as an Arabization process, although the appearance
of these trends is not always indicative of a Salafi influence. The salafisation of Hui Muslims has affected nearly
all sects, albeit in different ways. Amongst
Salafis, the re-introduction of orthodox
sources after a significant period of
isolation, and amplified now by globalizing forces, led to the breakdown of the old Salafi community as a new
generation of Salafis (the early
graduates and pilgrims) in the 1980s
sought to “correct” the errors of their elders.
This was reflected in the schism that
emerged over the interpretation of certain Quranic verses, the appearance of a more activist opposition to Sufism
leading to the demolishment of some Sufi tombs in the Northwest, and the enunciation of a takfeeri (excommunicatory)
stance towards “deviant” Salafis and non-Salafi Muslims that led to bouts of
sectarian infighting. Beyond the
Salafis, salafisation is also observable amongst Yihewani and Gedimu (“old”
traditional) Muslims who, in many cases, while
not describing themselves necessarily as Salafis (due to fears of ostracization
or out of a fidelity towards the Hanafi madhab), embraced aspects of
this intellectual tradition. In the Yihewani case, it is marked by a revived interest
in the Wahhabi origins of the movement.
On another level, Saudi influences
have, counterintuitively, encouraged a fragmentation of the Salafi community within
China. This has been driven of two
factors: First, the introduction of new sources of funding and ideas brought
by Saudi organizations, preachers, and affiliated graduates led to the
proliferation of new “mosque communities” or jama’at amongst Salafis, a
development that was principally shaped by the leadership struggles that
assumed an intergenerational character. Second, Salafis – like other sects – were not exposed to homogenous
discourses on Islam or Salafism, mainly
because of existing cultural and linguistic barriers, and the multiplicity of
doctrines and agendas pursued by various organizations and preachers, which
have induced a splintering effect along doctrinal and ritualistic lines within
the Salafi community, even if less pronounced than elsewhere in the Islamic
World.
Indeed, the most significant
outcome of these two simultaneous developments is that it has helped give way
to the formation of what can be called a “Salafism with Chinese
characteristics.” Its proponents – mainly from
the 1990s generation, are charting new discourses about Salafism that deviate
from that which exists in the Saudi mainstream. Most notably, there is a strong rejection of sectarianism
(although there is a troubling growth in anti-Shia sentiment) and an emphasis
on ecumenical approaches – a shift that stems principally from what many view
as the takfeeri legacy of the 1980s that led to unnecessary
confrontations with the wider Muslim community. Indeed, the Salafis today encounter severe challenges in
proselytize and even practicing in places like Xining, Qinghai.
The post-90s generation is also far
more internationalist and, to a
large extent, far more cognizant of the realities facing Hui Muslims within the
Chinese state (as a minority of a minority contending with the attention of the
state security apparatus). While courting Saudi funding and literature, it is
selective in what discourses it seeks to reproduce. This explains why some
Saudi-oriented Salafis are increasingly discouraging visits by Saudi preachers,
who are unable to appreciate the specificities of Chinese Islam there. More
importantly, this new generation is more willing
to cooperate with the authorities, and is
displaying signs of seeking to participate more actively within the political
channels that have been traditionally dominated by Sufi and Yihewani groups.
In all, the Hui Salafi scene and its
connections to Saudi Arabia are complex. The community is fragmenting intellectually and generating new
discourses that reflect the tensions that confront new religious authorities
and groups seeking to navigate the difficult waters between perceived orthodoxy
and the realities of their situation.
Hui Salafis want to carve out a space
of their own within China. Their concerns are not political per se: Across the spectrum, they appear to have embraced the apolitical quietism one expects to see within the Saudi clerical
establishment. Even with regards to the Uighur Salafis – if we speak in terms of an Islamic political
project – there is little evidence to suggest a burgeoning solidarity between
the two groups. Historical hatreds
notwithstanding, the evolution of Uighur Salafism has taken a completely
different trajectory than that of the Hui and its political/religious dynamics
are therefore different. Rather, for the
majority of Hui Salafis, their concerns remain solely those of identity and
religious legitimization.
Mohammed Al-Sudairi is a
graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar
(International Politics). He spent two years in Beijing studying Chinese and
undertaking freelance research.
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